Categorizing Sin: Part 1 (Incontinence)
Can desire truly overpower the will?
Since the dawn of time, mankind has tried to figure out what constitutes ‘right’ and ‘wrong.’ Regardless of one’s stance on whether morality is objective, societies have always tried to figure out functional systems of moral conduct. Another important question, however, is: what are the types of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’?
Why address this question of moral categorization in the first place? Well, the question of what actions are worse or ought to be most severely punished has been a core legal question since the rise of civilization. Analyzing the motivation behind wrongdoing can help us understand each other better and, thus, address wrongdoing effectively.
In discussing this issue, I am not suggesting that these categories are strict and all forms of sin neatly fall into one or the other. I am also not claiming that these are the only types of sin. But, I do believe that these three categories cover wrongdoing quite well, as they do a good job of representing the common motivation behind immoral action.
The first type, which I will be covering in this article, is arguably the most common. People usually have a defined set of convictions about what they ought to do and not do, yet they still violate it. Why? One major reason is that many are led away by their passions.
This is a fundamental sin, central to our nature. The Greeks termed it ‘akrasia,’ roughly translating to ‘weakness.’ In Dante’s Inferno, those guilty of this usually find themselves in the shallowest layers of hell, broadly referred to under the category of ‘Moral Incontinence.’
Some argue that a disconnect between your value structure and what you do — in other words ‘akrasia’ — cannot exist. Socrates famously argued that: “No one goes willingly toward the bad.” He believed that this was because all human actions are motivated by the pursuit of what that person believes to be good.
Yet, we can certainly suppose the existence of a person who merely acts according to their desires with no coherent normative system.1 In fact, many people already act like this on a certain level. They exist in a wave of probabilities, with the action they collapse into depending on where the violent storm of desire hurls them.
Many think that nihilism is only found in literary fiction, but I would argue that this behavior is one of its key manifestations. You could be technical and argue that it still implies a categorical imperative2 — a selfish, hedonic one at that. It is undeniable that to act means to believe in the worth of said action on some level. Nonetheless, it is clear that this is not a stable structure of moral decision-making, very unlike anything the average moral realist3 would argue in favor of. To be clear, this type of behavior should not be confused with incontinence — the failure to act in line with our values as a result of desire — as this involves a lack of stable values beyond primtiv
In arguing that incontinence is a form of sin, I am not saying that emotions should not guide our ethical reasoning. Far from it. In fact, without them, it would be impossible to even make moral decisions in the first place. Every moral judgment is grounded in values, which are shaped by our irreducible personal experience of the world. The disconnect happens when our raw passions sway us from the careful integration of experience, emotion, and reason that lead us to form our understanding of right and wrong.
In the next article of this series, I will explore the second category of wrongdoing: ‘moral error.’
System of what ‘should’ or ‘should not’ be done
An unconditional moral obligation
A person who believes that moral truths are mind-independent